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analysing inter-provincial variations in the quality of service delivery in Pakistan, the paper 
argues that the more fragmented, factionalised, and polarised the party systems, the greater are 
the incentives for patronage, weakening service delivery improvements. Fragmentation and 
factionalism both exacerbate the information problems that voters have in assigning credit 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The lack of relationship between democracy and improvements in the services for poor 
people is one of the more enduring puzzles in development.  The last three decades have 
witnessed a huge increase in the number of democratic governments in the world, but not 
concomitant improvements in services for the poor.  Instead, it appears that many democracies 
in the developing world systematically pursue policies that hurt the welfare of the poor.   
The experience of Pakistan bears witness to this problem.  Between 1988 and 
1999, the country experienced its longest period of democratic rule, and also a decline in 
its social indicators, particularly with regards to basic education.  Given that the median 
voter in Pakistan is poor, and given that improvements in education and health services 
have a positive impact on the lives of the poor, why do elected politicians not act on the 
demands of the median voter and improve these services?  Elected politicians in Pakistan 
appeared to be far more concerned with patronage, or doling out targeted favours to a 
small number of privileged groups, rather than on providing public goods that would 
benefit the majority of citizens.  Assuming that Pakistan’s politicians were rational 
agents, who sought to maximise their chances of remaining in office, the question then is: 
What were the constraints under which these politicians were operating that resulted in 
these perverse incentives?       
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In analysing this puzzle, this paper builds on the substantial, and growing, 
literature on institutions and economic development, particularly the subset of this 
literature that focuses on the political economy of service delivery.1  This literature has 
recognised that information is the key reason why elected officials may actually pursue 
policies that benefit the few at the expense of the many.  To get elected, politicians must 
credibly communicate to voters that they personally were responsible for certain 
improvements in their lives, a requirement that tends to favour targeted benefits, or 
patronage, rather than public goods.  For example, this tradeoff is evident in the decision 
on whether or not to undertake patronage-based recruitment of teachers.  On the one hand 
this recruitment will benefit a narrow segment of the population that gets these teaching 
jobs, and these ‘clients’ will be well informed about who was responsible for hiring them, 
but the general quality of public education will suffer.  On the other hand, if teachers are 
qualified and are made to show up regularly to class to teach, then education will clearly 
improve but it will be difficult for voters to clearly assign this improvement to the efforts 
of a particular politician.   
Institutions have an important impact on this tradeoff between patronage and 
service delivery.  The specific institution that this paper focuses on is political parties, 
and argues that three feature of the party system have important bearing on this tradeoff: 
the number of political parties or the degree of fragmentation of the party system; the 
internal cohesion, or degree of factionalism of political parties; and the degree of ethnic 
divide or polarisation among political parties.2  The higher the levels of party 
fragmentation, factionalism, and polarisation, the greater the incentives for patronage, 
and the poorer the quality of service delivery.  Party fragmentation increases the 
informational demands on voters since there are many more candidates and therefore, 
many more messages that voters have to evaluate during election time.  When political 
parties are highly factionalised they do not provide their members with stable career 
prospects, and politicians have a relatively greater incentive to focus on targeted goods so 
as to build a personal reputation that they can carry across party lines.  Finally, in highly 
polarised party systems, the provision of public goods provides less political benefits as 
different ethnic groups have different preferences over, and cannot agree on, the public 
goods to be provided. 
This argument is developed by looking at the inter-provincial variation in party 
structure in Pakistan, and its correlation with the quality of service delivery.  The quality 
of service delivery is measured by expenditure patterns within sectors, such as the 
relative emphasis on non-salary recurrent as opposed to salary expenditure; and the 
quality of sector governance, as measured by the degree of politicisation of the 
bureaucracy, and the adherence to proper procedures for staff recruitment and 
procurement.  In provinces where the degree of factionalism, fragmentation, and 
polarisation was higher, there were greater incentives for patronage, expenditure patterns 
were less efficient, and there were greater problems in sector governance.  The outline of 
the argument is sketched out in Figure 1. 
 
1The literature on institutions and growth is large, beginning with North’s seminal work [North (1981)].  
Acemoglu, et al. (2004), and Keefer (2004) provide excellent reviews of the literature.  On service delivery, the 
recent works include World Bank (2003), Keefer and Khemani (2003), and Keefer (2002). 
2This classification is borrowed from Mainwaring and Scully (1995). 
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Fig. 1.  The Outline of the Argument 
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The structure of the paper roughly follows this outline. The next section attempts 
to establish some stylised facts regarding inter-provincial variations in the quality of 
supply of education and health services in Pakistan.  Section 3 then begins the political 
economy analysis, by first examining a couple of commonly made explanations in 
Pakistan for these governance problems—namely, élite capture and the impact of 
political instability.  Section 4 presents the main argument on how the structure of the 
party system interacts with these informational asymmetries and exacerbates or abates 
these incentives. Finally Section 5 concludes by summarising the discussion, and 
pointing to some reform options. 
Two caveats are in order before proceeding.  This paper does not examine issues 
related to the demand for education.  In fact, it assumes that the demand for education is 
high, and focuses instead on political market failures that fail to translate this demand 
into supply.  There is some empirical justification for this assumption in Pakistan, as 
there has been considerable growth of private schools in recent years, particularly in the 
rural areas.3  This growth in private schooling represents parent’s dissatisfaction with 
government schools, and the demand for better quality education.  Nevertheless, this 
assumption of high demand is clearly simplistic, especially with regards to female 
education in Pakistan. As a number of studies have shown, enrolment of girls, 
particularly in rural areas, is lower than that for boys, and it is lower for all income 
groups.  Girls are also more likely to drop out of school than boys, and their school 
attendance is also much more sensitive to school quality than that of boys.  Clearly 
therefore, the demand for girl’s education cannot be taken as a given.  However, delving 
into issues of demand will distract from the purpose of this paper, which is to examine 
how supply failures can exist independently of demand-related issues.  
 
3Pakistan (2006).  
Party polarisation 
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Second, this paper limits its analysis to the democratic period between 1988 and 
1999, and therefore does not examine the impact of the recent devolution initiative on 
policy-makers incentives to improve service delivery.  Devolution has brought about a far 
reaching change in the functioning of government in Pakistan, with the main 
responsibility for the delivery of education, health, water and sanitation, roads and 
transport, and agriculture services devolved to district, tehsil, and, to some extent, union 
governments.4  This functional devolution has been accompanied by complex political, 
fiscal, and administrative changes, and a detailed analysis of the impact of these changes 
on the incentives of local policy-makers is beyond the scope of this paper.    
 
2.   PAKISTAN’S POOR SERVICE DELIVERY: EXPENDITURE        
PATTERNS AND SECTOR GOVERNANCE 
Despite respectable per capita growth, high levels of foreign development 
assistance, and impressive reductions in poverty, Pakistan has among the worst social 
indicators in the developing world.  The 1990s, Pakistan’s decade of democracy, was 
also a decade of stagnation in intermediate and outcome social indicators.  The net 
primary enrolment rate had declined from 46 percent in 1991-92 to 42 percent in 2001-
02, with male enrolments declining from 53 percent to 46 percent, and female from 39 
percent to 38 percent.5 At the provincial level, educational outcomes for Sindh and in 
particular Balochistan worsened considerably, while NWFP witnessed a modest 
increase in enrolments. Other social indicators paint a similarly depressing picture.  
Access to indoor piped drinking water declined from 25 percent to 22 percent, and 
there were only modest improvements in immunisation coverage and reductions in the 
incidence of diarrhea.    
As is now well-known, these poor social indicators are not due to poverty or lower 
rates of economic growth. As Easterly (2003) shows, Pakistan significantly 
underperforms when compared to other countries at similar levels of per capita income, 
and when compared to countries that on average grew at a similar rate.  For example, 
Pakistan has 36 percent fewer births attended by trained personnel, an infant mortality 
rate that is 27 per thousand higher, and a gross primary enrolment rate that is 20 percent 
lower than countries with similar income levels. Similarly, growth in Pakistan appears to 
have less of an impact on social sectors than in other countries—between 1960 and 1998, 
as per capita GDP more than doubled in Pakistan, infant mortality declined by 43 percent, 
as compared to a decline of 73 percent in a group of low income countries that on 
average grew at the same rate.  
This stagnation was particularly disappointing given that the 1990s was also the 
period of the Social Action Programme, which was up to that point the most concerted 
effort at improving service delivery in the country’s history.  Between 1992 and 2000, the 
government and the donor community spent a total of $9 billion on the programme—
two-thirds of this funding went to education, with disappointing outcomes. 
One common reason cited for this poor performance was that social sector 
expenditures were squeezed as a result of the deteriorating macro-economic situation in 
the country.  As a result of the accumulating debt burden from running high fiscal deficits 
 
4See World Bank (2004a) for a detailed discussion. 
5Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (various years). 
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in the 1970s and 1980s, the 1990s was a period of declining fiscal space with, at its peak 
in 1997, almost 60 percent of public expenditures being consumed by debt servicing.  
Education and health expenditures declined from 2.2 and 0.7 percentage of GDP in 1987-
88 to 1.7 and 0.5 percentage of GDP by 1999-00.  However, despite these declines, social 
sector expenditures were prioritised and protected relative to other sectors—for example, 
agriculture and irrigation spending declined by 30 percent between 1990-91 and 1999-00, 
and even defense expenditures declined from 6.3 percent of GDP in 1991-92 to 4.2 
percent by 1998-99. 
It would also be erroneous to attribute declining outcomes primarily to this 
reduction in aggregate expenditures.  As the World Development Report 2004 points out, 
cross-national evidence suggests that there is no systematic relationship between 
expenditures and outcomes in education and health.  The reason for this lack of 
relationship is that in many cases this spending fails to reach the poor, and is of poor 
quality because of (a) poor expenditure patterns and (b) poor sector governance.  Both of 
these factors are a key to the under-performance of the Social Action Programme.  
Moreover, while these problems were evident across the country, there was interesting 
variation around this ‘poor average’.  In other words, while all provinces performed 
poorly, some performed worse than others.  
 
2.1.  Expenditure Patterns 
While overall social sector expenditures were protected relative to other sectors 
during the 1990s, intra-sectoral allocations were suboptimal. Specifically, the 
construction of new buildings and the hiring of additional staff were prioritised at the 
expense of  operations and maintenance.  As Figure 2 and Figure 3 reveal, the advent of 
democracy—first with the limited, non-party based electoral democracy under General 
Zia-ul-Haq  in 1985,  and then the fully-fledged party-based democracy from 1988—saw  
 
Fig. 2.  Number of Primary Schools, 
Pakistan, 1980-2000  
Fig. 3.  Number of Primary Teachers, 
Pakistan, 1980-2000 
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Source: Economic Survey and National Education Management Information System (NEMIS). 
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a surge in school construction and particularly, teacher recruitment.6  The number of 
public sector primary schools nationally increased by 70 percent from 1985 to 1999-2000 
(from approximately 77,000 to over 132,000), and the number of primary teachers almost 
doubled (from 179,000 to roughly 350,000) over the same period.  This surge was 
particularly salient in the province of Sindh, with primary schools increasing by 
approximately 180 percent (from roughly 14,000 in 1985 to 39,000 in 1999-00) and 
primary teachers increasing by 125 percent (from roughly 45,000 in 1985 to 101,000 in 
1999-00).  The fact that net primary enrolment rates declined in Pakistan in the 1990s, 
with a particularly significant decline in Sindh, is a stark reminder of the lack of 
correlation between educational inputs and outcomes.   
There were also significant staffing increases in other sectors, particularly health 
and the police, and the overall size of the provincial bureaucracy increased by 35 percent 
between 1988 and 2000.  As Table 1 shows, the highest increase was in Sindh (60 
percent), followed by NWFP (48 percent), Balochistan (29.5 percent), and Punjab (22 
percent).   As a result of these increases, Sindh, and in particular Balochistan, were 
relatively overstaffed as compared to Punjab and NWFP.  The number of civil servants 
per 100 of population was 1.50 in Sindh and 1.95 in Balochistan, as compared to 1.48 in 
NWFP and 1.21 in Punjab.  
 
Table 1 
Trends in Provincial Employment 
 1988-89 2000 
Growth  
(1988-2000) 
Civil Servants per 100 
Population (2000)* 
  Punjab 722,916 888,796 22.9% 1.21 
  Sindh 285,042 457,494 60.5% 1.50 
  NWFP 177,106 262,074 48.0% 1.48 
  Balochistan 98,942 128,132 29.5% 1.95 
Source: The World Bank (2004). 
           * Based on the 1998 census. 
 
These increases in the number of schools, and in particular staffing, were not 
matched by concerns for quality, and where the increases were the greatest, as in Sindh, 
the quality improvements were the lowest.  With regards to the recurrent budget, the bulk 
of health and in particular, educational expenditures were consumed by salaries, and 
remained so despite the strong emphasis in the Social Action Programme for increasing 
operations and maintenance expenditures.  Non-salary expenditures (which for example 
consists of expenditures on textbooks, furniture, blackboards, medicines, injections, 
equipment, as well as on maintenance and repair) increased only modestly, rising from 
1.2 percent of total expenditures in education in 1992-93 to 4.7 percent by 1998-99, and 
from 18.5 percent of total expenditure in health in 1992-93 to 29.5 percent by 1998-99.7   
As  Figure 4 and  Figure 5 reveal,  the  inter-provincial  variation  around this national  
 
6This fact is also corroborated in field-based studies.  For example, one study of schooling in 5 rural 
districts found that over a third of the village schools in the sample had been constructed after 1985 [Gazdar 
(2000)]. 
7MSU (2000), based on revised estimates of SAP expenditures only.  
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Fig. 4. Share of Non-salary 
Expenditure in Education (as 
Percent of Total Expenditure) 
Fig. 5.  Share of Non-salary 
Expenditure in Health  (as 
Percent of Total Expenditure) 
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Fig. 6.  Percentage of Girls Primary 
Schools with Latrines 
Fig. 7.  Percentage of Girls Primary 
Schools with Boundary Walls 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan
1995/96 2002/03
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan
1995/96 2002/03
 
Sources: NEMIS, MSU (2000). 
 
average was considerable.  In education, the least increases were in Punjab (from 1 
percent to 3.6 percent) and in Sindh (from 0.9 percent to 3.5 percent) and the largest were 
in NWFP (from 1.2 percent to 9.7 percent).8  The inter-provincial contrast in health 
expenditures was more marked, with the share non-salary health recurrent expenditures 
actually declining in Sindh (from 16.5 percent to 14.5 percent) and Balochistan (from 
32.3 percent to 21.5 percent) between 1992-93 and 1998-99, while increasing 
significantly in Punjab and the NWFP. 
Similarly, with regards to the development budget the emphasis was on 
constructing new buildings at the expense of improving the quality of the existing 
facilities.  Again, the contrast between Sindh on the one hand, and Punjab and NWFP on 
the other was striking.  For example, as Figure 6 and Figure 7 show, between 1995-96 
and 1999-00 the percentage of girls’ schools with latrines and boundary walls—both of 
which are important features of school quality, and have a large impact on encouraging 
parents to send their daughters to school—were roughly stagnant in Sindh (from 59 
percent to 60 percent, and 68 percent to 67 percent respectively).  By contrast, they 
increased in Punjab and NWFP.    
 
8It should be noted that the figure for NWFP is likely to be overstated due to misclassification of some 
‘establishment’ type expenditure as non-salary salary expenditure [MSU (2000)]. 
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2.2.  Quality of Sector Governance 
The considerable mismanagement associated with these increased inputs 
compounded the problem of poor intra-sectoral allocations.  Teachers were recruited 
primarily on patronage grounds, and the schools built were of poor quality because of the 
commissions given to the contractors.  The best evidence for this abuse were a series of 
Third Party Validation exercises conducted by the Auditor General of Pakistan as part of 
the Social Action Programme. These exercises, conducted between 1998 and 2001, 
examined the extent of departmental compliance with existing procedures and criteria in 
the areas of procurement, site selection, and recruitment, as well as the adequacy of 
systems for the monitoring of staff absenteeism.    
Cumulative results for the four rounds of the exercise revealed that nationally on 
average only 72 percent of the sampled cases of recruitment, 43 percent of procurement, 
and 68 percent of site selection, followed the required procedures.  As Figure 8 shows, 
the inter-provincial variation around this national average is considerable, with Sindh and 
Balochistan performing much more poorly relative to Punjab and NWFP.  For example, 
in Sindh only 58 percent of the sampled cases of recruitment, 38 percent of procurement, 
and 41 percent of site selection followed the required criteria.  By contrast, in NWFP 
these figures were 91 percent, 50 percent, and 66 percent respectively.   
 
Fig. 8.  Cumulative Results of TPV for the Social Action Programme (1998-2001):   
Percentage of Cases Following Proper Procedures 
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The marginalisation of the public services commissions was a significant factor in 
the governance problems relating to recruitment, and nowhere was this problem more 
serious than in Sindh.  In general, democratically elected governments in Pakistan have 
sought to undermine the scope and independence of the services commissions, and to 
introduce greater departmental discretion in the recruitment of the upper echelons of the 
civil service.  For example, the 1973 constitution, introduced by the government of 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, removed the constitutional guarantees that had earlier been given to 
the services commission.   Chairmen and members now held their posts for varying terms 
of mostly two to three years, and were dependent on the government for the extension of 
their service.  Moreover, existing civil servants could be appointed as chairmen (and 
members), thereby compromising their independence.  This lack of autonomy was 
particularly severe in Sindh, as the government used its discretion to remove chairmen 
and members on three occasions—the entire commission (chairman and all ten members) 
was disbanded in 1994, the chairman was removed in 1997, and the chairman and two 
members were removed in 1998.    
There is an obvious link between these abuses in recruitment and staff 
absenteeism.9  At one level, if recruitment was based on political criteria, and not on 
merit, then the appointed teachers would not be the ones most qualified for the job, and 
would also likely be protected from disciplinary action by their political bosses.  In 
addition, and more interestingly, anecdotal evidence reveals that recruitment was also a 
revenue-generating activity for politicians and bureaucrats, with primary school teacher 
posts being ‘sold’ for Rs 35,000 to Rs 50,000.10  Given that these are relatively large 
sums of money for the people who were recruited, and were often paid by taking out 
loans, it created incentives for absenteeism to the extent that the inducted teachers needed 
to take on a side job to finance these investments.11 
Endemic staff transfers were another problem negatively impacting the quality of 
service delivery.  While the provincial government’s Rules of Business explicitly 
required that staff remain in a particular post for 3 years, in practice, as Table 2 indicates, 
average tenure was much lower.   The problem was more severe in Sindh, as compared to 
Punjab and NWFP.  For example, in Sindh, during the democratic period, the average 
tenure of secretaries in 7 key departments was approximately 12 months, as compared to 
14 months in Punjab and NWFP.  Interestingly, across the three provinces tenure was 
worse in departments such as education and works and services that had the greatest 
potential for patronage, either through employment or through the implementation of 
development schemes.  This  rapid  turnover  of staff was an indicator of the politicisation  
 
9There are very few estimates of teacher absenteeism in Pakistan.  One survey, conducted by the World 
Bank, revealed that out of the 206 schools surveyed, classes were not being held in 34, or in 16 percent, at the 
time of the survey visit [World Bank (2002)].  Even in schools in which classes were being held, the rate of 
teacher absenteeism was high, at around 20 percent.  The problems in Sindh were worse than in Punjab and 
NWFP, with almost 30 percent of the schools not holding classes.   
10Based on informal discussions with various education department staff in the provincial and district 
governments. 
11Another indicator that these problems were worse is Sindh is the high proportion of “non-functional” 
schools.  As per the National Education Census (2006), 12.5 percent of educational institutions (mostly primary 
schools) were non-functional in Sindh, as compared to 2.4 percent, 4.4 percent, and 2.6 percent in Punjab, the 
NWFP, and Balochistan, respectively.  A major reason for non-functional schools is the permanent absence of 
the teacher.  
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Table 2 
Average Tenure (in Months) of Secretaries in Key Departments  
(Jan. 1, 1989 – Dec. 31, 1999) 
Department Sindh Punjab NWFP 
Education 9.4 13.2 9.4 
Health 12.0 14.7 13.2 
Works and Services 9.4 9.4 11.0 
Services (Establishment) 12.0 14.7 22.0 
Agriculture 11.0 14.7 12.0 
Finance 12.0 16.5 14.7 
Planning and Development 18.9 18.9 26.4 
    
Total (7 Departments) 11.9 14.0 14.4 
Source: Services departments of the provincial governments. 
 
of the bureaucracy, and clearly disruptive to effective management of the sectors.  Staff 
transfers at junior levels were also endemic, particularly of teachers, although it is 
difficult to get data to indicate the magnitude of the problem. 
To summarise, the above analysis suggests that Pakistan’s elected policy-makers 
were motivated to hire teachers and doctors, but less motivated to worry about the quality 
of teaching or medical staff that were recruited.   They were also motivated to build 
schools and basic health units, but less motivated to worry about maintaining this 
infrastructure, and for ensuring that it was of good quality.  The key question is what 
were the underlying political and institutional reasons for these poor expenditure patterns 
and governance problems.  Moreover, why were these incentives so much worse in Sindh 
as compared to Punjab and NWFP?  Was this a failure of the accountability of policy-
makers to the public, or was it a more complicated failure of the political market.  These 
issues are taken up in the rest of the paper.      
 
3. SOME COMMON POLITICAL ECONOMY EXPLANATIONS:               
ELITE CAPTURE AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY 
This paper, following the new political economy literature, began with the 
puzzle as to why democratic governments can pursue policies that hurt the very 
majorities that voted them into power.  This puzzle assumed that the numeric weight 
of the lower classes makes them a vital resource in democratic politics.  A large body 
of literature on underdeveloped countries rejects this assumption altogether because 
it ignores the effects of power and societal dominance.  Instead, this literature argues 
that inequalities rooted in society translate into unequal political influence—for 
example, because of the rural poor’s dependence on elites for their economic well-
being it would be naïve to expect the disadvantaged to exercise an independent voice 
in the democratic process.  Elite capture is a standard political economy explanation 
for the lack of a pro-poor public policy generally, and for problems in service 
delivery specifically.   For example, Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) argue that in 
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‘oligarchal’ societies, elites will oppose mass education because the more educated 
the population the greater the pressures for democratisation, and the greater the threat 
to the power of these privileged groups.   
In Pakistan, a popular version of this elite capture hypothesis takes the form of the 
‘feudal politics’ argument.  To summarise, this argument rejects the notion of electoral 
accountability and citizen voice, and argues that policies instead reflect the preference of 
rural elites, and that these preferences are explicitly against improvements in education.12  
These rural elites are able to win elections, either through outright coercion, or through 
their monopoly economic and political position in their constituency, and not because of 
their responsiveness to voter demands.  And their monopoly position is dependent on 
keeping their constituents backward.  To quote one prominent economist “the ruling 
élites found it convenient to perpetuate low literacy rates.  The lower the proportion of 
literate people, the lower the probability that the ruling elite could be displaced.”13  And 
given that these feudal elites were particularly powerful in Sindh and Balochistan is one 
possible explanation for the particularly severe service delivery problems in these 
provinces.    
While popular, there are a number of problems with the élite capture, or feudal 
politics, argument.  For one, in a number of constituencies in Pakistan, in particular 
rural constituencies, powerful ‘feudals’ have been defeated at the polls, often by 
opponents from non-privileged backgrounds by comparison.  Feudal politics implies 
that votes are cast for individuals rather than for political parties, which in turn 
implies that there should be a relatively large proportion of candidates who win as 
independents in elections.  However, as Table 3 below indicates that, except for the 
case of Balochistan, independent candidates won a small proportion of seats in 
provincial assembly elections between 1988 and 1999.14  Even in Sindh, which is 
considered to be the bastion of feudal politics, independent candidates won only 6 
percent of seats in the provincial assembly elections of 1988 and 1993.  Sindh in fact 
had roughly the same proportion of victorious independent candidates as Punjab, and 
much less than NWFP and Balochistan.  These data do not to deny the importance of 
the personal characteristics of candidates in determining electoral outcomes.  
However, the fact that belonging to a political party is so important does suggest that 
voting behaviour is more complex than that suggested by the popular model of 
societal dominance of rural landed élites.   
 
Table 3 
Percentage of Seats Won by Independent Candidates in Provincial Assembly Elections 
 1988 1990 1993 1997 
Punjab 12.1% 6.7% 8.3% 7.9% 
Sindh 6.0% 19.0% 6.0% 13.0% 
NWFP 20.0% 21.3% 15.0% 13.8% 
Balochistan 17.5% 12.5% 22.5% 20.0% 
Source: Election Commission of Pakistan. 
 
12See Haq (1998) and Husain (1999) as some of the prominent examples of this argument. 
13Husain (1999), p. 359. 
14The proportion is even smaller for the National Assembly elections. 
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Electoral studies reveal that, unlike what is postulated in the feudal politics model, 
politicians care about, and spend a great deal of their time, in dealing with the problems of 
their constituency.  For example, as one study noted “virtually every politician interviewed 
throughout the course of this research emphasised the growing expectation and demand of 
voters that candidates serve as conduits for patronage” [Wilder (1999), p. 106].  The 
importance of patronage is also underlined by the practice, initiated by the Junejo government 
in 1985 and subsequently duplicated by the Sharif and Bhutto governments, of allotting funds 
to individual MNAs and MPAs to spend on development schemes in their constituencies.15  In 
fact, as we saw earlier, elected politicians cared a great deal about school construction and 
teacher recruitment, as was particularly apparent in the case of Sindh, which as mentioned 
earlier is widely considered to be the domain of feudal politics.   
Field studies also reveal that the problems of schooling in rural areas have little to 
do with direct feudal resistance.  For example, one study found that “there are relatively 
few instances of total patron power in sample communities… [and that] it is no longer 
possible to trivially ascribe school failure to patron-induced distortion.”16  Of the 125 
schools sampled in the study, in only one case had a large landlord actually prevented the 
establishment of a school.  Instead, the study found that local politics was one of ‘partial 
patron power’ with political competition between patrons in an electoral system that was 
highly responsive to public demands.   Instead, a major reason for school non-
functionality was that teachers were appointed on the basis of political connections, and 
therefore had little incentive to focus on teaching.   
Political instability is another commonly made explanation for the failure of the 
democratic governments in Pakistan.  Easterly (2003) for example makes the point that the 
rapid turnover of regimes in the 1990s meant that Pakistan politicians behaviour was akin to 
what Mancur Olson termed as ‘roving bandits’.  That is, since politicians had a short time 
horizon they had an incentive to ‘loot today’ rather than to ‘invest for tomorrow’.  Between 
1988 and 1999, Pakistan had four elected governments, and in such short terms of office 
politicians had less of an incentive to implement policies that require a longer time to show 
results.  Improvements in service delivery, such as ensuring better quality teaching, unlike the 
provision of government jobs or construction of school buildings, do not bear immediate fruit.  
Econometric studies have also shown that ‘a higher propensity of change in executive power, 
either by constitutional or unconstitutional means’ leads to lower investments in public goods 
and slower economic growth.17 
Political instability is however, endogenous to policy.  In Pakistan a major reasons 
why terms of office were short was precisely because elected politicians engaged in 
widespread rent-seeking and corruption, thereby greatly discrediting themselves and 
creating the necessary conditions for their dismissal.  In 1988, when democracy returned 
to Pakistan after a hiatus of 11 years, there was no reason a priori to expect that the 
government would be short-lived.  In fact, the end of a long and repressive period of 
military rule had created considerable hope and excitement in Pakistan, but the new 
government quickly dissipated this political capital, resulting in, for example, declining 
 
15These programmes were called the Peoples Programme and the Tameer-e-Watan programme by the 
Benazir Bhutto and the Nawaz Sharif government respectively. 
16Gazdar (2000), p. 59–64. 
17Alesina, et al. (1996). 
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voter turnout in provincial and national assembly elections and considerable 
disillusionment with democratic government.  These actions therefore beg the question—
why were incentives such as to encourage rent-seeking at the expense of public goods.  
One needs to explain the more fundamental causes of this political instability, rather than 
view instability as a given.  
  
4.  THE ARGUMENT: THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL PARTIES  
AND THE INCENTIVES FOR PATRONAGE 
Information is the key reason as to why democracies can produce outcomes that 
hurt the median voter.  Politicians care about getting elected, and they will focus on 
policies and will emphasise expenditure in areas that will maximise their electoral 
fortunes.  Importantly, getting elected is also crucially contingent on information—
specifically, it requires that voters are able to connect improvements or deteriorations in 
their welfare to the actions of a particular politician.  In other words, politicians must be 
able to credibly take credit for these improvements.  As a recent and growing body of 
literature points out, this importance of information implies that politicians are likely to 
be more responsive to the more informed group of citizens, and as a result focus more on 
private goods, or targeted benefits, as opposed to public goods that benefit the majority.18   
Some public goods, such as the provision of roads, are much easier to verify and credit 
to the efforts of a particular politician, than others, such as better quality healthcare or 
education.   As the World Development Report 2004 points out, education and health place 
very high informational demands on voters as these are transaction-intensive services with 
outcomes that are crucially dependent on the behaviour of providers that are very difficult to 
monitor.  Therefore, one would expect politicians to focus more on roads, and evidence from 
Pakistan seems to suggest that this is indeed the case.  As mentioned earlier, in Pakistan, 
members of parliament are each given funds to spend on development works in their 
constituency, and the largest proportion of these funds were spent on roads.19 
While some public goods like roads will get more attention than others, individual-
specific favours will in general receive even greater priority.  The reason is that demands 
for public goods and for individual-specific favours differ in the relative ease with which 
preferences are transmitted to policy-makers.  Individual contacting for particularised 
benefits places the least organisational demands on citizens, and presents the clearest 
relationship between action and result.  Demands for public goods entail free-rider 
problems and are therefore much more difficult to organise.20 Since individuals are much 
 
18Important recent works in this literature include Persson and Tabellini (2000); Keefer (2002); Keefer 
and Khemani (2003). 
19This analysis is of the Peoples Programme introduced by the first PPP government of Benazir Bhutto 
(1988-90) and the Tameer-e-watan programme introduced by the first Nawaz Sharif government (1991-93).  
Both these programmes provided each member of the national assembly with development funds to spend in his 
or her constituency.   
20The CIET (2002) survey showed that citizen contacting of politicians in Pakistan is motivated 
primarily by (a) individual-specific problems; and (b) to the extent that issues about service delivery are raised, 
they relate more to roads and water supply rather than education and health.  The majority of reasons cited by 
male and female respondents alike related to personal issues, such as financial support, the issuance of identity 
cards, a police problem, or some form of dispute.  Those who contacted for reasons of service delivery did so 
regarding mainly about water, roads, and electricity.  Less than 2 percent of the respondents approached local 
officials for education and health matters.   
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more likely to lobby for private goods, they are also likely to be much more informed 
about whether or not this demand was satisfied, and whether or not this fulfilment was 
due to the efforts of their elected representative.  For example, people will observe how 
helpful the local representative’s office was, how much attention was paid to them, and 
what were the impressions of others waiting in line, and obviously whether they received 
the benefits.  By contrast, improvements in service delivery will be much harder to 
measure.   
The informational problems associated with the provision of public goods 
highlighted above are likely to be similar across developing countries, and therefore on 
their own cannot provide an adequate explanation for why the supply of these goods is 
lower in some countries as compared to others.  Specifically, given that it would be 
difficult to make the case that voters in Pakistan were relatively more uninformed than 
their counterparts in other countries, or that within Pakistan they were more uninformed 
in Sindh relative to Punjab or NWFP, one needs additional ingredients to explain the 
variations in the quality of service delivery outlined earlier.   
Clearly, institutions—specifically how institutions interact with informational 
problems—are one such key ingredient.  Recent papers have examined how institutions, 
particularly electoral arrangements and regime types, influence the incentives of policy-
makers to provide public or targeted goods.21  While popular in the literature, electoral 
systems and regime types do not throw much light on the problems of service delivery in 
Pakistan as there is no variation across the provinces in these specific institutional 
features.   
Political parties are another important institution, and one that has not received 
sufficient attention in the new political economy literature.  In democracies, political 
parties are the key organisational structures mediating between voters and policy-
makers, and the structure of the party system, as well as the internal organisational 
structure of political parties, is therefore likely to have considerable influence in 
shaping the incentives of politicians.  Party identification is also important precisely 
because voters are uninformed.   To elaborate, voters, in developing countries and 
developed countries alike, tend to cast their ballots both on partisan considerations 
and on the basis of the personal characteristics of individual candidates.  In many 
ways, partisan identification can be viewed as an informational short cut.  That is, 
given that voters do not have the time to be informed about the details of a 
candidate’s policy position, or past record, a candidate’s identification with a 
particular party ideology, or with a particular party leader, provides voters with a 
cheaper means of differentiating between candidates.   This partisan identification 
however, also complicates the ability of an individual candidate to take credit for a 
particular action, such as improvements in public education.  Specifically, voters may 
give this credit to the party as a whole, which, depending on the structure of the party 
system may create perverse incentives for individual policy-makers.  
Three features of the party system are likely to have bearing to these incentives—
the number of parties, or the degree of fragmentation or fractionalisation of the system; 
the internal cohesion, or degree of factionalism, of political parties; and the ideological 
distance, or polarisation, between the political parties.  As we shall see, all of these 
 
21See Keefer (2004) for a comprehensive survey of the literature.  
Politics of Service Delivery 
 
143
features—both of the party system, and of specific parties within the system—have 
important bearing to the problem of service delivery in Pakistan.   
 
5.1.   Party Fragmentation 
Fragmentation increases the informational problems of voters since there are many 
more candidates and therefore many more messages and claims to evaluate at election 
time.  As discussed above, voters as it is find it difficult to associate improvements in 
service delivery with the actions of a particular politician.  A large number of contestants 
challenging the incumbent’s claims for taking credit for any service delivery 
improvements increase the informational demands on voters.  The greater the number of 
candidates per seat in an election, the greater the informational demands on the 
electorate.  Anticipating this difficulty, the incumbent will have greater incentives to 
focus on particularised benefits that he can more easily take credit for.  Importantly, 
providing targeted benefits is also likely to be a more viable electoral strategy if there are 
a large number of competing candidates.  Given that the vote will be divided up among 
the larger number of contestants implies that the voters that can be won over through 
focusing on targeted expenditures will carry more weight in deciding the electoral 
outcome. 
Figure 9 shows the average number of candidates per seat in provincial assembly 
elections in Pakistan in the four general elections between 1988 and 1997.  As can be 
seen, Sindh had the highest number of candidates, and therefore the greatest degree of 
fractionalisation, with on average approximately 12 candidates competing per seat in the 
1993 elections.  By contrast, Punjab and NWFP had the least degree of fractionalisation, 
with on average 6.8 and 6.4 candidates per seat in the 1993 elections. 
 
Fig. 9.  Average Number of Candidates Competing per Seat in Provincial Assembly 
Elections in Pakistan, 1988–97 
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5.2.  Party Factionalism 
Factionalism refers to the internal cohesion of political parties.  Highly 
factionalised parties are characterised by considerable infighting among the different 
political factions in the party, an inability to work towards ‘corporate goals’, and 
considerable insecurity of tenure for its members. Specifically on the last point, an 
incumbent politician of a highly factionalised party knows with a certain probability that 
he may not be competing the next election on the same party ticket.  This insecurity gives 
him an incentive to focus on activities that enhance his personal reputation, a reputation 
that he can carry with him across party lines, which in turn creates incentives to focus 
more on individual favours rather than on public goods.   
To elaborate, even if the party system is not fractionalised, a voter will find it 
difficult to associate improvements in service delivery with the actions of the incumbent.  
As far as the voter is concerned, education and health services could have improved 
through exogenous circumstances, or through actions of other individuals within the 
governing party.  In other words, the voter could hold the party, and not the individual 
candidate, responsible for the improvements.  Given this, each party member will be 
wary of taking actions that enhance the party’s reputation as he or she may be competing 
against his own party in the subsequent election.  Therefore, the more factionalised the 
ruling party the greater the incentives for each member to focus on providing targeted 
benefits that he or she can more easily take credit for as an individual.      
Conversely, improvements in the quality of education, such as through managerial 
reforms to reduce teacher absenteeism, will likely need the cooperation of other party 
members to implement, which is more difficult in factionalised parties. 
Figure 10 gives  a  sense of the scale of factionalism in political parties in Pakistan. 
 
Fig. 10.  Percentage of Incumbents Competing Provincial Assembly Elections 
from Their Constituency on the Same Party Ticket 
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The figure depicts the relative proportion of incumbent members of provincial assemblies 
contesting elections on the same party ticket from which they won the previous election.  
For example, the figure shows that 58 percent of the incumbents competed the 1990 
elections in Punjab on the same party ticket from which they had won in the previous 
election (in 1988).  Overall, the figures were the lowest for Sindh—with for example, 
only 36 percent in the 1993 elections—and highest in Punjab and Balochistan.  A 
significant number of these incumbents actually competed as members of another party, 
while others did not compete from their prior constituency.22  Either way, this high 
degree of ‘candidate churn’ suggests the importance for incumbents to establish a 
reputation for themselves among voters that transcends party identity, which again 
created incentives to focus on particularised benefits.    
The reasons why political parties in Pakistan have become highly factionalised and 
fractionalised are complex, and there are few comprehensive analyses of the subject.  
Most political observers agree that the long periods of military rule, in particular the 
eleven-year government of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88) had a detrimental impact on 
party politics in the country.  In the late 1960s the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) had 
emerged as the most significant political force in what was then West Pakistan.   PPP’s 
mobilisation strategy was organised explicitly along class lines, with an appeal, under the 
campaign slogan of ‘Islamic socialism’, to the rural poor and to industrial labour, and was 
very different from the more traditional, patron-client methods of the other political 
parties.  The PPP’s comprehensive victory in West Pakistan in the 1970 general elections 
marked the beginnings of a new era in politics, as party identity, in particular the appeal 
of a charismatic leader in the person of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, superseded the influence of 
local élites, and traditional vote banks. 
The current weaknesses of the party system are associated with the decline of the 
PPP and the inability of other parties to develop an ideologically based mass appeal.  
General Zia-ul-Haq, who came to power through removing the Bhutto government in a 
military coup, was dedicated to destroying the PPP as a political force, and did so through 
both outright repression as well as through developing alternative nodes of political 
representation.  The PPP was banned, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto hanged, and most of its 
leadership jailed, but more significantly Zia encouraged what one analyst terms the 
‘localisation of politics’, which undermined the PPP’s national appeal.23  This process of 
localisation began with the holding of local government elections on a non-party basis, 
which were designed to serve as a political pressure valve and to deflect attention away 
from the PPP, and culminated with the national elections in 1985, also held on a non-
party basis.   
Localisation and patronage politics was bad for party discipline.  If elected 
representatives are evaluated primarily for their constituency service then they have 
incentives to maximise the resources at their disposal, and since these resources are 
scarce, there is intense competition for funds.  By contrast, partisan voting by the 
electorate implies that the electoral fortunes of members of the same party are tied 
together.  If party members are constantly bickering then the party’s reputation suffers 
and legislator’s lose votes.   
 
22Some of these candidates did compete for the same party but in a different constituency. 
23Wilder (1999). 
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In addition to these centrifugal pressures created by localisation, the PPP, and 
other major political parties, also suffered from organisational weaknesses that 
undermined their cohesion.  Party organisation was never high on the agenda of the PPP 
under Benazir Bhutto in the 1980s and 1990s.  One factor was the absence of internal 
party elections.  Instead, the party organisation was highly personalised, with people 
close to the leadership being appointed to key posts, as opposed to being elected from 
amongst the party membership.  This personalisation promoted factionalism.  According 
to one PPP leader “every leader of the People’s Party is more interested about his rival 
inside the party than his rival outside the party.”24 
 
5.3.  Party Polarisation 
There is a widely observed empirical linkage between ethnicity and the provision 
of public goods.  Alesina, Easterly, and Baqir (1999) found that more ethnically diverse 
jurisdictions in the United States spent less on a per capita basis on public goods like 
education and roads.  Easterly and Levine (1997) reported that Africa’s high level of 
ethno-linguistic diversity was the single most important cause of the continent’s low rate 
of economic growth.  They also found that ethnic diversity was negatively correlated with 
various measures of public goods, such as teledensity, percentage of paved roads, and 
years of schooling.   
There are a number of possible explanations for this relationship between ethnicity 
and public good provision.  One is that different ethnic groups have different preferences 
over public goods, and find it difficult to reach agreement on which public goods to 
provide.  As one early study observed, ethnic tensions result in the “ethnicisation of 
collectively provided goods … non-excludability, a defining characteristic of public 
goods, is violated.  Ethnicity serves as a basis for exclusion.  And the excluded 
communities clearly perceive such decisions as ‘public bads.’”25  Similarly, Alesina, 
Easterly, and Baqir (1999), argue that the heterogeneity of preferences for public goods 
across ethnic groups leads to the low supply of these goods.  Ethnic polarisation also 
reduces the accountability of elected politicians, as voters tend to vote for candidates 
based on their ethnic background, and not on their public performance and policy records 
[Keefer and Khemani (2003)].  Provision of public goods suffers as a result of this lower 
accountability.    
Ethnic, religious, and more generally social, polarisation is clearly an 
important feature of Pakistan.  There are 20 languages spoken in the country, and six 
major ethnic groups.  In addition to ethnicity, tribal and clan rivalries are also an 
important feature of local politics.  In Punjab for example, biraderi, or clan, 
affiliations are considered a key determinant of voting behaviour.26   In the 1970s, 
with the rise of the Pakistan Peoples Party, identity politics took a back seat to 
class—based politics.  However, it is generally believed that ethnic and biraderi-
based politics was strengthened during the military rule of Zia-ul-Haq as political 
parties were banned, and candidates for local bodies elections, and the 1985 national 
elections, were forced to appeal to traditional identities.   
 
24Quoted in Wilder (p. 136). 
25Rabushka and Shepsle (1972), pp. 84-85.  
26See Wilder (1999) for a discussion. 
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Ethnicity was a particularly important feature of politics, and the source of 
much strife, in the province of Sindh, and therefore one reason why clientelist 
pressures are so much worse there than in the other provinces of Pakistan.  The major 
source of tension was  between the muhajirs, or urdu-speaking migrants that came 
from India at the time of partition and settled in the urban areas, particularly Karachi, 
and the local Sindhi population.  Socio-economic inequality was the root cause of the 
conflict—the muhajirs, with higher levels of education, dominated the urban-based 
economy, as well as the upper echelons of Sindh’s public administration in the initial 
years after Partition.  Governments, beginning with the first PPP government of the 
1970s, had responded by setting quotas in the bureaucracy and in educational 
institutions, which became a major source of grievance for the muhajirs, and the 
basis of their political mobilisation by the MQM (Muhajir National Movement) 
during the 1980s.  During the 1990s, there was intense political competition between 
the PPP on the one hand, and the MQM on the other.  The two parties won roughly 
50 percent and 30 percent seats respectively in the provincial assembly elections 
throughout the decade, with the PPP drawing its strength almost exclusively from the 
rural, Sindhi-speaking areas, and the MQM winning exclusively from the urban, 
Urdu-speaking areas.   
 
Table 4 
Characteristics of Party Competition in the Provinces 
 Characteristics of  
Party Competition 
Degree of Polarisation 
between Political Parties 
Punjab • Two-party competition between PPP 
and PML, with some seats going to 
independents 
• Little ideological or ethnic 
distinction between the two parties 
Low 
Sindh • Two large parties—PPP and MQM; 
and a number of smaller parties and 
independents  
• Extreme ethnic political divide—
MQM dominating the mohajir vote, 
and PPP, and other smaller parties, 
dominating the Sindhi vote 
High 
NWFP • Three main political parties—PPP, 
PML, and ANP 
• Declining ideological division; very 
little ethnic division 
Low 
Balochistan • A number of small political parties 
• Significant ethnic division between 
Pashtun and Baloch political forces 
Medium 
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This degree of political polarisation was absent in Punjab and NWFP.  Essentially, 
two-party competition prevailed in the Punjab, involving the PPP and the PML (Pakistan 
Muslim League).  There was very little ideological difference between the two parties, 
and virtually no ethnic differentiation.  In NWFP, Pashtun nationalism had been a 
significant political force in the 1960s and 1970s, but had lost much of its appeal by the 
1990s.  The three main political parties—the PPP, PML, and the formerly nationalist 
ANP—had little separating them, either ethnically or ideologically.  In Balochistan, there 
was a significant ethnic divide between the Baloch and Pashtun parts of the province, and 
political competition involved a number of small parties appealing to ethnic, religious, as 
well as tribal loyalties.  However, this polarisation was not of the same magnitude as in 
Sindh, nor did it manifest itself in similar levels of ethnic strife.  Table 4 summarises the 
characteristics of party competition in the four provinces. 
 
6.   CONCLUSION 
This paper has analysed inter-provincial variations in Pakistan in order to probe 
into the underlying political reasons for the poor service delivery in the country.  While 
acknowledging that service delivery was poor across the country, it showed that there 
were important differences in expenditure patterns in education and health across the four 
provinces, as well as variations in the quality of sector governance.  Specifically, the 
incentive to focus on recruitment and new infrastructure investments, at the expense of 
operations and maintenance, and quality improvements, were the greatest in Sindh, and 
less severe in Punjab and NWFP.  Similarly, governance problems associated with 
politicisation in the processes for recruitment of staff, for procurement, and for site 
selection of new facilities, as well as problems of staff absenteeism, were the worst in 
Sindh as compared to NWFP and Punjab.  These findings are summarised in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 
Summary of the Relationship between the Provincial Political Economy  
Factors and the Quality of Service Delivery 
 Political Institutional Factors Quality of Service Delivery 
 Party 
Fragmentation 
Party 
Factionalism 
Party 
Polarisation 
Quality of 
Expenditure Patterns 
Quality of Sector 
Governance 
Punjab Low Medium Low Above average Above average 
NWFP Low Low Low Above average Above average 
Sindh  High High High Below average Below average 
Balochistan Medium Medium Medium Average Below average 
 
The paper showed that there is an interesting relationship between these service 
delivery inputs on the one hand, and some institutional features of the political party 
system on the other.  Specifically, provinces with fragmented, factionalised, and 
polarised party systems, such as Sindh, scored the poorest on these inputs.  Fragmentation 
and factionalism both exacerbated the informational problems that voters had in 
assigning credit (blame) for service delivery improvements (deterioration), and thereby 
created incentives for politicians to focus on targeted benefits.  Polarisation, particularly 
ethnic polarisation, reduced the ability of groups to agree on the provision of public 
goods, thereby again causing politicians to favour the delivery of targeted benefits. 
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With devolution, the main responsibility for service delivery in Pakistan has now 
been shifted to local governments.  The main logic of devolution is that bringing 
government closer to the people increases the accountability of elected policy-makers to 
the public, and creates the necessary incentives for these policy-makers to act on the 
public’s demands for improved service delivery.  Indeed, locally elected representatives 
in Pakistan are now much more accessible to voters, and the political participation of 
women has increased significantly. 
While a detailed analysis of the impact of devolution on service delivery is beyond 
the scope of this paper, anecdotal evidence suggests that local politicians are subject to 
the same pressures for patronage as their provincial and federal counterparts, and 
therefore increased accessibility per se is unlikely to result in dramatic improvements in 
service delivery.  Moreover, devolution has resulted in considerable political tensions 
between the provincial and local governments, particularly in provinces where the 
provincial and district governments are run by opposing political parties.27  These 
tensions have manifested themselves in particular in control over staff, and in many ways 
have resulted in further politicisation of the bureaucracy. 
The preceding analysis therefore, suggests that improvements in service delivery 
in Pakistan are conditional on changing the political incentives of elected policy-makers, 
whether at the local, provincial, or national level.  The underlying political tradeoffs 
between patronage and provision of public goods in Pakistan will need to change, and 
this in turn will require political reforms, such as the strengthening of the internal 
organisation of political parties through holding of regular internal party elections, as 
well as campaign finance reforms that reduce the need to deliver specific favours in 
return for money for campaigning.   
These reforms are likely to be feasible only in the medium to long term.  A more 
feasible short-term alternative could be the development of institutional mechanisms that 
reduce the ability of politicians to act on these pressures for patronage.  Some of these 
measures could include independent Public Service Commissions that are given oversight 
over the recruitment and perhaps even career management (transfers and postings) of key 
service delivery personnel; improvements in the legal and regulatory framework for 
procurement, and freedom of information legislation so as to provide citizens with access 
to key public records.   
International experience also shows that policies that increase the information 
available to citizens, particularly specific information regarding particular government 
actions, can have a significant impact on increasing citizen pressures for improving 
services.28  For example, use of Citizen Report Cards and Public Expenditure Tracking 
Surveys, and publicising these results, have had some successes in countries such as 
India, Uganda, Philippines, and Ukraine in building the public awareness that was 
necessary for building greater political commitment to improve services.   Pakistan also 
has a number of data sources that can form the basis of a public information campaign.  
For example, the CIET Social Audit survey, conducted in 2001-2 and 2004-5, measures 
citizen satisfaction with a number of services, such as education, health, water supply, 
and police.  These can be used in the same manner as Citizen Report Cards have been 
 
27See World Bank (2004a) for a detailed discussion of these issues. 
28The World Bank (2003) provides a number of examples of the impact of increased information.   
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utilised in other countries. Similarly, the Pakistan Social and Living Standards 
Measurement Survey (2004-05) provides a host of intermediate and outcome social 
indicators that can form the basis of a public information campaign. 
Devolution also offers the opportunity for the federal and provincial governments 
to set in place incentive systems that can encourage local governments to work towards 
service delivery improvements.  Unlike many other federations, Pakistan has not 
adequately explored the potential for conditional fiscal transfers as a tool to achieve 
national priorities, relying almost entirely instead on block transfers between the national 
and provincial, and between the provincial and local governments.  A selective use of 
conditional grants, preferably conditioned on specific outcomes, such as improvements in 
primary enrolment and in immunisation coverage, could provide the necessary counter-
balance to the prevailing incentives to focus on patronage. 
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